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**RESERVE FORCES IN FUTURE NON-NUCLEAR  
EXPENDING CONFLICTS**

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**6 October 1972**

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6 OCTOBER 1972

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BY

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(Essay)

RESERVE FORCES IN FUTURE NON-NUCLEAR  
EXPANDING CONFLICTS .

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October 6, 1972



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page No.</u>
Introduction -----	1
Reserve Components - Past and Present Thinking -----	4
Future of the Reserve Forces in the Seventies -----	12
Incentives for the Citizen Soldier -----	18
Conclusions -----	21
Recommendations -----	21
Bibliography -----	23

## ABSTRACT

**AUTHOR:** Lt. Col. Irvin R. Garrison  
**TITLE:** Reserve Forces in Future Non-Nuclear Expanding Conflicts  
**FORMAT:** Essay

What will be the future of Reserve Components in the seventies in expanding conflicts? How the Reserve Forces will be utilized in the years ahead can be determined only by immediate past actions involving the Reserve Components and stated plans of those presently in positions of authority. Data was gathered by examining the literature about Reserve Forces since World War II and for proposed usage in the future.

The public statements of our Military, Defense Secretaries and other public officials make it clear that there will be an increased emphasis on future immediate mobilization of the Reserves and less reliance on a draft buildup.

# RESERVE FORCES IN FUTURE NON-NUCLEAR EXPANDING CONFLICTS

## INTRODUCTION

The Reserve Components of American Military forces have been built on the tradition of citizen responsibility to help meet the needs of local and national security. The system for developing military capabilities in a part time force was established by national law in 1792 but the major responsibility for the program went to the states instead of the central government. This militia system of State military forces constituted the only national reserve for the Army until World War I.

Between 1879 and 1916 the modern National Guard developed into the Army's reserve. A reserve force exclusively under Federal control made its debut in the National Defense Act of 1916. The Act established the Organized Reserve which included the Officers' Reserve Corps and the Enlisted Reserve Corps. Reserve components for the Navy and Marine Corps were also created in 1916. These components were wholly under Federal Control.

Between World War I and World War II all reserve components of the Armed Forces were beset by a general indifference of the public to military affairs. Plans for the post war era of the Army's Reserve Components were formulated during the latter part of World War II. The National Guard was apprehensive about losing their status as a combat unit and aggressively defended their position as the number one reserve organization. As a result of this

maneuvering, two Reserve forces came into being, the National Guard and the Reserve Components.<sup>1</sup>

Since its inception, both the National Guard and Reserve Components have undergone many reorganizations, each one designed to strengthen and enhance their mobilization capabilities. Efforts have been made to merge the two components and Congress has repeatedly turned down these merger proposals. Levantrosser says, "Reorganization and turbulence are key words in describing the current status of administration of the Army's two reserve components."<sup>2</sup>

Basically, the mission of the military reserve components of the U. S. is to provide trained units and qualified personnel for the active Armed Forces in time of National emergency. The personnel may be used as filler personnel in active or reserve forces. In addition, the reserve forces must be capable of providing a base for large scale mobilization. A well-trained, well-equipped reserve force serves our nation in several ways. It improves the flexibility of our national military position by providing a ready source of manpower to back up our international commitments and negotiations without having to maintain an impractically large active force. A competent reserve stands beside our Nuclear weapon to add to our deterrent forces.

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1. William F. Levantrosser, Defense Manpower Management of The Reserve Components, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, (1967), pp. 1-10.

2. Ibid., p. 16

Title 10, United States Code, Sec. 261 (a) lists the Reserve

Components of the Armed Forces. They are -

- (1) The Army National Guard of the United States
- (2) The Army Reserve
- (3) The Naval Reserve
- (4) The Marine Corps Reserve
- (5) The Air National Guard
- (6) The Air Force Reserve
- (7) The Coast Guard Reserve <sup>3</sup>

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3. Annual Report of The Secretary of Defense on Reserve Forces, Department of Defense, FY 1968, Appendix A, p. A-2



## RESERVE COMPONENTS--PAST AND PRESENT THINKING

"The Militia of this country must be considered as the Palladium of our security, and the first effectual resort in case of hostility; it is essential therefore that the same system should pervade the whole; that the formation and discipline of the Militia of the continent should be absolutely uniform, and that the same species of arms accoutrements and military apparatus, should be introduced in every part of the U. S." <sup>4</sup>

This statement was made by George Washington in a circular sent June 8, 1783 to the governor's of Virginia, Maryland, New York and Connecticut. One hundred and eighty nine years later Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird stated:

"One major step we have taken is our new policy with respect to reserve forces. Members of the National Guard and Reserve, instead of draftees, will be the initial and primary source for augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the active forces." <sup>5</sup>

While George Washington and Secretary Laird are speaking of two different types of citizen soldier, the former armed with muskets and small cannon, the latter trained and equipped with sophisticated weaponry, both have essentially the same idea about the role of a citizen soldier. While this has generally been the stated role of Reservists and National Guardsmen, political considerations have often altered this policy at the time its implementation should have been ordered. While Washington conceived of a militia using regular army

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<sup>4</sup> U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee No. 3, "Review of the Reserve Program," (11 May 1960) p. 6635

<sup>5</sup> Fiscal Year 1972-76 Defense Program and the 1972 Defense Budget, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird (March 1971) p. 36

equipment and trained to fit in with them in time of need, his foresight has not always been heeded. In the 1971 Defense Report, Secretary Laird stated that an important aspect of our Total Forces approach to providing the Forces that might be needed in the event of a major conflict is increased reliance on Reserve and National Guard forces. This requires that we place greater emphasis on the readiness of reserve component forces. Laird feels that to improve reserve readiness, we must recognize the importance of two interrelated factors, manning levels and availability of equipment.<sup>6</sup>

Secretary Laird stated in this same report that the overall situation in the Reserve Components today is that equipment availability and quality limit combat readiness to levels below those imposed by manpower limitations.<sup>7</sup>

It should be universally recognized that all our wars have been fought by citizen soldiers. Our regular establishment has provided top leadership and adequate basic military doctrines, however it is clearly understood that World War II Reserve units of civilian soldiers found it necessary to train from one to two years before they went into combat. We cannot count on another period of grace.<sup>8</sup>

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6. Ibid., p. 100

7. Ibid., p. 101

8. 20th Century Minutemen, "A Report to The President on a Reserve Force Training Program," U. S. National Security Training Commission, (1 Dec. 1953) p. 129

The National Security Training Commission stated:

"Our present reserve system is unsatisfactory. To vitalize our reserves we must give reservists pre-training to bring them to a state of readiness that will qualify them for quick deployment in an emergency." <sup>9</sup>

General George C. Marshall, while Chief of Staff stated his thoughts on a military establishment by reiterating some of the same views expressed by Washington. He says that since all our great wars have been fought in the main by citizen armies, the proposal for organized citizen army reserve in time of peace is merely a proposal for perfecting a traditional national institution to meet modern requirements. Marshall feels this is the type of army which President Washington proposed to the First Congress as one of the essential foundations of the New American Republic. He further commented that the type of our military institutions were determined in the beginning by the form of our government and has not changed since Washington's Administration and therefore it will be made the basis for all plans for a post-war establishment. <sup>10</sup>

While appearing before Subcommittee No. 3, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on The Armed Forces, May 8, 1960, Major Gen. Frederick M. Warren stated that the Army Reserve is at it's highest degree of mobilization readiness and has a basically sound modern organization designed to readily complement existing ground forces in the event of either a limited or general war situation. <sup>11</sup>

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9. Ibid., p. 129

10. Ibid., p. 138

11. Op. Cit., p. 6485

Despite General Warren's views, when a buildup was needed in Viet Nam, the Reserve Forces were called upon in a limited mobilization. Past experience, mobilization readiness and need seem to be over ridden by political considerations of the immediate time in question.

Secretary Packard stated in a letter to the President in 1969 that "The Reserve Forces continue to serve a vitally important role in our overall posture of national security." <sup>12</sup>

General Peers, in 1969, while Chief of the Reserve Components forecast a reduction in the overall strength and organization of the Active Army, while at the same time he could see no corresponding reduction in the capabilities of those whom we consider as our potential enemies around the world. He felt it prudent to point out the traditional reliance our nation has placed upon the Reserve Forces in time of crises. He said "I strongly support the view that the Army Reserve has the capability to again provide units and qualified personnel to augment the Active Army if and when required."<sup>13</sup> Peers says the objective is to establish mutual confidence between the Active Army and the Reserve Components through better understanding, development of a sense of belonging and full integration of planning.<sup>14</sup>

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12. Annual Report of The Secretary of Defense on Reserve Forces, "Memorandum To The President", (Jan. 1969)

13. Lt. Gen. William E. Peers, "National Security: A Continuing Challenge," The Army Reserve Magazine (Nov-Dec 1969).

14. Ibid., p. 8

Again, in 1972, Lt. Gen. Richard G. Stillwell stated, "there must and will be a greater interaction between the Active Army and the Reserve Forces." <sup>15</sup>

Stillwell advances the idea that any major increase in world tension will result in the political decision for selective or partial mobilization as a minimum, and that, by consequence, our Reserve Components will be called upon to meet stringent readiness objectives to sustain, support, or replace deployed forces. Since they will be called upon for immediate duty, it follows that the Reserves will get the necessary priorities in equipment, for training and for schooling to insure their reactive capability. <sup>16</sup>

It must be remembered that whereas current Secretaries of Defense and present service leaders are speaking in the political climate of today, and may predict what to them is a logical sequence of events, political leaders of tomorrow may view the world situation and the expected usage of Reserve Forces quite differently. Both the Active and Reserve Forces bow before the shifting winds of political fortunes. Will future Presidents see the need or have the courage to call upon the Reserve Forces to meet a threat arising beyond our shores? Such a Reserve call-up continues to present a considerable political risk. Elliot says mobilization of citizen Reserve Forces in the United States always has involved some degree of political risk to the

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15. Lt. Gen. Richard G. Stillwell, "Big Three of Modern Army," The Army Reserve Magazine, (Feb. 1972) p. 27

16. Ibid., p. 27

administration concerned, since sooner or later this action had to be justified to the electorate in terms of the results achieved and the factual proof of its necessity. It is a proclamation to all concerned of the determination of the Constitutional leadership of the Nation to see the crisis through at all costs. It does serve the purpose of convincing an opponent that the American Government means business. <sup>17</sup>

The Pentagon planners have always contemplated the call-up of Reserves in times of need as a quick way of expanding our Armed Forces. The Reserve Components have undergone repeated reorganizations to remain as an effective backup for the Regular Forces. Secretary Stephen Ailes stated before Subcommittee Number 2, Committee on Armed Services that the current proposed reorganization was being undertaken for the purposed of bringing manpower and equipment into balance with each other and with contingency war plans, producing increased combat readiness, and streamlining the management structure of the Army's Reserve Components. <sup>18</sup>

General Harold K. Johnson, while Chief of Staff, United States Army, made a statement before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee on March 1, 1965, at which time he said this country maintains in its active Army establishment today forces capable of immediate movement and we endeavor to maintain a rate of combat readiness for deployment so that any element of the Active Army can

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17. George Felding Elliot, "An Indicator of The Will to Win", The National Guardsman, (Dec. 1967) p. 2.

18. U. S. Congress, House, Subcommittee No. 2, Committee on Armed Services (25 March 1965) p. 2.

be moved within the first 30 days after a go order is given to the Army. He further commented that our Reserve Components must be able to begin their flow into an area of conflict not later than the completion of movement of the Active Army, and desirably with a minimum overlap during the latter stages of Active Army movement.<sup>19</sup>

In 1967, speaking before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, General Johnson said that it is important to establish the fact that the total Army establishment consists of two major parts. These parts are the Active Army and the Reserve Components consisting of U. S. Army National Guard and U. S. Reserve.<sup>20</sup> He further commented that there is a direct relationship between the number of units maintained in the active establishment and the number of units maintained in the Reserve establishment as these two forces are used to span the time gap. The point at which Reserve units become a part of the bridge is the point at which Reserve units can be prepared for deployment.<sup>21</sup>

While it is clear that the Reserve Components have figured in planning for mobilization, these planner's could not foresee political decisions. Although urged on at least three occasions by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to call up the Reserves in the Viet Nam conflict, this was not done until early 1968, and then only on a very small scale.<sup>22</sup>

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19. U. S. Congress, Senate, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services, (1 March 1965).

20. U. S. Congress, Senate, The Committee on Armed Services (26 June 1967) p. 1.

21. Ibid., p. 4

22. "Pentagon to Cut Use of Draftees in Fast Buildups" New York Times, (Sept. 9, 1970) p. 1.

In the past ten years the Reserve Components have undergone almost constant reorganization. In December 1962 a plan to reorganize the U. S. Army Reserve and National Guard was placed in effect by the issuance of departmental orders. This order resulted in the reduction or elimination of many units of the Reserve and National Guard. Again in December of 1964, a plan was announced that called for the transfer of all Army Reserve units to the National Guard. The Armed Services Committees of Congress did not concur in this overall plan. In 1965, The Secretary of Defense announced that a Selective Reserve Force would be authorized. SRF units received priority within the Reserve Components for training at Active Army Training Centers, specialist schools, and OCS. A new re-alignment plan was announced June 2, 1967, following Congressional opposition to the proposed reorganization of 1964. The new plan called for set limits on the Reserve and National Guard. It called for combat units to come under the National Guard structure, leaving in the Army Reserve only mobilization base units. Congressional objection, however, required that the proposed realignment be modified. This the Army did in August of 1967 and reorganization began in December of 1967.<sup>23</sup> With Secretary McNamara's demise in the Defense Department, efforts at destroying the Army Reserve ceased and Defense Planners began to cooperate with Congress in building a strong Reserve Force.

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23. "U. S. Army Reserve: 'Our Heritage, Our History,'" The Army Reserve Magazine, (April 1968), pp. 9-11



## FUTURE OF THE RESERVE FORCES IN THE SEVENTIES

Secretary Laird reviewed past and present strategy concepts for the Committee on Armed Services on March 9, 1971, by referring to the Eisenhower Administration as one of Strategic Superiority, the Kennedy-Johnson era as one of "Assured destruction" and "flexible response." The Nixon strategy is one of "Realistic deterrence".<sup>24</sup>

The basic objectives of the strategy of realistic deterrence is to prevent armed conflict. The strategy of realistic deterrence emphasizes the need to plan for optimum use of all military and related resources available to meet the requirements for free world security. Laird calls these a "Total Force", which includes both active and reserve components of the United States, those of our Allies, and the additional military capabilities of our allies and friends that will be made available through local efforts.<sup>25</sup>

As a part of this total force concept, Secretary Laird stated,

"One major step we have taken is our new policy with respect to Reserve Forces. Members of the National Guard and Reserve, instead of draftees, will be the initial and primary source for augmentation of the Active Forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the Active Forces."<sup>26</sup>

Laird discussed the lower sustaining costs of the nonactive duty forces, as compared to the cost of maintaining larger active duty forces. This makes possible a greater flexibility in planning

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24. U. S. Congress. House, Committee on Armed Services, Part 1, (1971) pp. 2327-2330

25. Ibid., p. 2332

26. Ibid., p. 2341

the total force structure. This lower cost of nonactive forces allows more force units to be provided for the same cost of nonactive forces allows more force units to be provided for the same cost in an all active force structure. It further requires that the capability and mobilization readiness of Guard and Reserve units be promptly and effectively enhanced. <sup>27</sup>

Assistant Secretary Hittle restated the concept of a single force when he said the readiness of our Reserve must be the paramount consideration in the expenditure of efforts and resources on our Reserve forces. If our Reserves are to be an effective and integral part of the total force, its readiness to transition quickly and effectively into the active forces must be maintained at the highest possible level. <sup>28</sup>

In his FY 1972 Annual Defense Department Report, Secretary Melvin Laird emphasized a Total Force planning. Again in the Fiscal 1973 Report, he reiterated this same Total Force idea and said he was confident the Nixon Doctrine peacetime force structure in the Five Year Defense Program would be adequate, if Congress voted the necessary funds. In this request for funds he included the following eight items:

Strategic Sufficiency  
Technological Superiority  
Weapons Modernization  
Sufficient Manpower levels

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27. Ibid., p. 2341-42

28. Ibid., p. 3701

Strong Guard and Reserves  
Adequate Operation and Maintenance  
Security Assistance  
Total Resource Utilization 29

Secretary Laird says that he is well aware that for many years we have talked about achieving a true combat ready status for our National Guard and Reserve and that considerable progress has been made, but by no means enough. Laird feels that we have only scratched the surface in utilizing the National Guard and Reserve forces in strategy planning. He says, "we have had, over the past decade, too much talk and too little action in making these units combat ready."<sup>30</sup>

Vietnamization of the war has resulted in millions of dollars worth of equipment to be sent to the National Guard and Reserves. The present FY 73 Budget calls for \$600 million increase for National Guard and Reserve Forces. Planning for the coming year envisages that the National Guard and Reserve Forces will receive more equipment than in any single year in our history.<sup>31</sup>

Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker says that the Presidents policy of using the Reserve as the initial and primary source for augmentation of the active forces is a significant change of policy over that of prior administrations. President Kennedy made the decision that the National Guard and organized Reserves would not be called up for the Viet Nam War. Instead, draftees would provide the necessary additional combat manpower. He says that in retrospect, this was one of the

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29. Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1973; (8 February 1972) p. 9.

30. Ibid., pp. 11-12.

31. Ibid., pp. 11-12.

major blunders of the Viet Nam War, accounting for much of the antipathy and frustration surrounding that divisive, indecisive conflict.<sup>32</sup>

General Westmorland stated in 1969 that the Army objective was to bring the Reserve Component units to a level of readiness which would be responsive to all contingency planning just as is required of the Regular Units. The Army would apply the same high standards of evaluation to the Reserve Components in all their activities as are applied to units of the regular establishments.<sup>33</sup> He also expressed his convictions that increased association between Regular and Reserve Component units would bring these two elements more closely together as One Army. He added:

"Reserve Components as a part of our contingency mobilization plans are symbolic of our national will and resolve to honor our commitments."<sup>34</sup>

Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard instructed the Services to put new mobilization guidelines into effect in January of 1971.<sup>35</sup> These instructions established four categories of mobilization:

Selective Mobilization  
Partial Mobilization  
Full Mobilization  
Total Mobilization

Selective Mobilization is defined as the call-up of selected reserve units or smaller components or individual reservists to meet what under normal circumstances would be domestic emergencies, but not external threats to national security.

32. "The New Reserve Status", Army Times, (Mar. 29, 1972), p. 13.

33. "Chief of Staff Sees Expanded Reserve Role", The Army Reserve Magazine, (September 1969), p. 6

34. Ibid., p. 7

35. "Reserve Mobilization Guidelines Are Set", The Army Reserve Magazine, (Jan. 1971), p. 4

Partial Mobilization is a similar call-up, only larger in size and designed to fill specific needs in the event of a less than all-out war or the threat of one.

Full Mobilization involves the expansion of the military by calling all of the 2.6 million ready reserve.

Total Mobilization includes the most critical threat to national security and involves mustering the men of the Standby Reserve and men of the retired reserve. <sup>36</sup>

Whatever the category of mobilization, unless the Reservists are fully equipped and trained they will be nothing more than cadre or fillers for regular units. Secretary Laird recognizes this fact and in 1970 instructed the Services to provide better equipment for the Stand-By-Forces. He issued a memorandum instructing the services to provide in future budgets modern weapons and equipment to increase the readiness of National Guard and Reserve Forces. <sup>37</sup>

It was further estimated that an Army National Guard or Army Reserve Division could be maintained for one-half to one-sixth the cost of an active duty infantry division. While there does not seem to be much chance of an increase in Reserve Forces, planners expect to establish new tactical fighter squadrons and new infantry brigades within existing reserve strength. <sup>38</sup>

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36. Michael Getler, "Fentagon Directive Defense Rules for Call-up of Reserve", The Washington Post, (Mar. 6, 1970) p. A 2.

37. Op Cit., New York Times, 9 Sept. 1970, p. 1.

38. Ibid., p. 1.

At the same time that the Reserve is being called upon to take a more active part in our nation's defenses, both the Army Reserve and National Guard are experiencing difficulties in meeting manpower requirements. Army Reserve strength fell by almost 27,000 from July 1971 to May 1972. The relationship of zero draft to Today's retention and recruiting environment has caused an immense personnel problem. <sup>39</sup>

At the same time the Army Reserve was having difficulty securing manpower, the other Reserve Forces were showing a decline in strength of from 1.1 percent to 6.22 percent. <sup>40</sup>

Without the draft as an incentive for young men to join the Reserve Components, most officials are convinced there must be added incentives if the Reserve Forces are to do the job expected of them.

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39. "USAR In The Real World". The Army Reserve Magazine, (July-August 1972), p. 4

40. "Reserve Dip Forces The Bonus Issue", Army Times, (8 March 1972), p. 6.



## INCENTIVES FOR THE CITIZEN SOLDIER

A large ready reserve is of vital importance. It widens the range of options available to the decision maker. Reserve Forces can be maintained more cheaply than a corresponding number of active forces, and this is economically attractive at a time when every effort is being made to reduce the defense budget.

However, since the elimination of the draft, which had a strong effect upon reserve enlistments, special incentives and inducements will have to be provided to maintain reserve force strengths at desired levels.

Secretary Laird has stated that one of the major challenges in moving to an all volunteer force and implementing the Total Force Concept is maintaining the strength of the Reserves and Guard. The three-month draft interruption and low draft calls during the final months of 1971 indicated that it will be difficult to meet Guard and Reserve strength requirements as draft calls decline toward zero. The Defense Department proposes to couple a vigorous and aggressive recruiting effort with a program of visible incentives which will make the Guard Reserve service an attractive avocation.<sup>41</sup>

Coupled with incentives already enacted are several proposals, to be used in a phased program to secure Reserve enlistments. The primary incentives proposed are:

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<sup>41</sup>. Ibid., FY 1973, p. 161

1. A proposal to establish a variable enlistment and selective re-enlistment bonus.
2. A proposal to extend Servicemen's Group Life Insurance and coverage to Guardsmen and Reservists on a full time basis.
3. A proposal to allow Guardsmen and Reservists with 25 years of creditable service to retire at age 55, rather than at sixty.
4. A proposal to allow persons who have completed all requirements for retired pay, except reaching the minimum age, to elect at age 50 either a lump sum payment in lieu of further claims or a reduced annuity on an actuarially sound basis. <sup>42</sup>

People and readiness were the dominant subjects of the Adjutants General meeting in Reno, Nevada in mid-May of 1972. It was the consensus that you have to have people before you have readiness. <sup>43</sup>

The Department of Defense feels that some or all of the above incentives will help the Reserve Forces obtain people, while at the same time they have not ruled out a Reserve draft. If the Reserve Components are to do their job they must have people and equipment.

If the statements of Defense Department officials, both appointed and military, Members of Congress, and the President can be taken as an indicator of the future expectations of the Reserve Components role in our defense strategy, it is time for the Reserve Forces to "put up or shut up". Reserve Components leaders have long sought full equality and partnership with the Active Forces in meeting the defense requirements of this country. With the increased budget for the Reserves

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<sup>42</sup>. Ibid., pp. 162-163

<sup>43</sup>. "Adjutants General Focus on People and Readiness", The National Guardsman, (June 1972) p. 22.



and with the Army channeling millions of dollars of new and rebuilt equipment to them, the Reserve Components must produce units fully manned, equipped, and trained for immediate mobilization.

The Reservists must cease to be the dedicated weekend warrior and become a part-time professional.

## CONCLUSIONS

1. Present Defense planning incorporates the Reserve Forces into all contingency plans presently being formulated.
2. Equipment of the Reserve Components is in an inadequate condition to meet mobilization needs.
3. Meeting manpower needs in the Reserve components when a zero draft status is reached will be a difficult task.
4. Training of the Reserve Components is below the standard necessary for immediate mobilization and replacement of Active Army Units.
5. During the Seventies the Reserve Components will play an even more important role than in the past.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the nations be constantly alerted to the idea that Reserve Components will be mobilized in any emergency requiring a build-up of forces.
2. That efforts be continued to fully equip the Reserve Components with the latest issue weapons and equipment.
3. That special incentives be established to induce young people to serve in Reserve Components.
4. That additional training sites and days be authorized the Reserve Forces so that training can be more effective.
5. That a continued "marriage" of Reserve and Active Forces be carried out so that more realistic training can be effected.

6. That by a continual public information program designed to enhance the image of the Regular and Reserve Forces in the minds of the public.
7. That the Reserve Components be so designed and plans formulated that will make the "Reserve" ready for immediate action.

*H. Col. J. M. R. J. J. J.*

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